Air Safaris-Southern Scenic Supremacy–Part 2

By Rob Neil.

One would assume that every aviation business would select the most appropriate aircraft for their intended jobs. Where money is no object, this presents few difficulties. However, not every operator has the backing of sheikhs, emirs or billionaire entrepreneurs, and the “right plane for the job” often ends up—understandably—being simply the least expensive compromise.

So it is that smaller operators around the world end up using an incredibly diverse range of aircraft and devising all manner of compromise solutions to multitudes of different challenges. It is the sign of a very good small operator if the aircraft selected for the job requires little or no compromise and turns out to be the “perfect” machine.

Such has been the case with almost every aircraft operated by Air Safaris during its nearly 40-year history. When the company began carrying individual hunters and hikers into mountainous back-blocks in 1970, there was probably no more suitable aircraft available for the job than the company’s first Cessna 180. As the company’s demands for greater capacity increased, the 180 was replaced by a 185. As its market evolved and back-blocks “taxi” flights gave way to tourist scenics, Cessna 206s joined the smaller taildraggers in Air Safaris’ fleet.

When Air Safaris began operating its 206s alongside its 185s in 1975, there really wasn’t a viable alternative able to fulfil the role they were being asked to perform—i.e. affordable scenic platforms offering reasonable flight performance, passenger comfort and visibility carrying four–five passengers from relatively short strips. Indeed, it was really only after the Australian-designed Airvan received FAA certification in 2003 that a viable alternative to the world’s long-serving Cessna fleet became available.

However, while Cessna’s 185s and 206s proved to be ideal aircraft for Air Safaris’ early operations, the company soon realised that they were becoming too small for its needs as increasing numbers of passengers flocked to enjoy the Air Safaris experience.

Being keen outdoorsmen themselves, both Richard Rayward and Graeme Murray understood the implications of increasing the numbers of small, noisy aircraft in pristine wilderness areas. Long before it became politically correct to advocate “environmental awareness” (which, today, many people pay mere lip service to), they understood that in order to grow the business in good conscience, they needed an alternative to the simple expedient of “more piston singles”.

In 1978, only three years after buying its first new Cessna 206, Air Safaris made the extremely brave move of purchasing a Pilatus PC-6 Turbo Porter. The move to this much larger turbine machine, with its ability to carry up to 10 passengers, was believed by many to be a bad move and there were dire predictions that the cost of operating a turbine would break the company.

In the end, the opposite was true, to the extent that Richard credits the Porter with putting Air Safaris on the map. Fitted with skis, the Porter could also land and take off on glaciers and snowfields with far more versatility than the company’s Cessna 185, which was also ski-equipped.

The effectiveness of the Porter spelt the end of the smallest Cessnas, and the 185s and 206s began to be replaced by Cessna 207s.

Despite being, to some eyes, one of the ugliest aeroplanes ever built, the company’s four 207s became the mainstay of Air Safaris’ smaller aircraft fleet for almost 20 years. However, despite its good service record and length of service, it was perhaps the least “ideal” of the various aircraft the company has operated. As anyone who has operated 207s will attest, it is very much a compromise aircraft with borderline performance (slightly less than the 206 in all regards) and its nominal “seven passenger” capability is rather optimistic at best (as anyone who has flown in the cramped rear of a 207 will also attest).

Nevertheless, there was still nothing else to replace it, and so the 207s (three turbos and one normally aspirated aircraft) soldiered on doing their noisily “adequate” best as an effective scenic aircraft for Air Safaris, operating alongside the Porter.

As detailed in the last month’s article, the Porter had proved to Richard Rayward that large turbine machinery was an effective answer to efficiency and environmental considerations, so that when he first saw the GAF Nomad being demonstrated, he immediately recognised it as the logical “next step” for Air Safaris.

At the same time as the smaller Cessnas began to make way for the 207s, the first of Air Safaris’ Nomads (an N22 GAF demonstrator) joined the fleet. As far as choosing the ideal aircraft for its operations, it was to be the best move the company had made to date—even better than the incredible Porter, whose size had now also become limited as demand for Air Safaris’ service continued to increase. Also, the Porter’s niche bush flying and ski plane attributes became less important to the company as helicopter numbers increased and took over much of that work in the area.

Even the short N22B version of the Nomad could carry 15 people to and from the strips Air Safaris used (Tekapo, Glentanner, Franz Josef and Milford) economically and comfortably.

The design of the Nomad was originally begun in the 1960s as an Australian government project. The first prototype (initially known as the N2) flew in July 1971 and received its Australian domestic type certificate in August 1972.

The Australian government ordered 11 of the short-fuselage N22s (as the production version became) for the Australian Army.

Sadly, it appears that the Australian Army resented having the Nomad “foisted” upon it and subsequently went out of its way to “discredit” the type. Quite possibly, the Nomad’s relatively light structure was not up to the abuse expected of a military workhorse aircraft. While the Nomad’s structure is plenty strong enough for its intended purpose, it is light—which means care must be taken not to abuse structure. It is not built like a tank.

It was extremely unfortunate that the Army’s “Nomad bashing” resulted in the type receiving a great deal of undeserved bad press and, subsequently, poor civil sales as a result.

In the opinion of Richard Rayward, who probably knows the Nomad better than anyone else, it is a shame that most of the initial flight testing and development involved military personnel, rather than civilians. “I’ve always felt that had there been people from a civilian operational background involved earlier, we might have ended up with a different aeroplane.”

The aircraft certainly has some distinctive “traits” and features that have the potential to be “weaknesses” if they are not adequately addressed by appropriate operating procedures. However, so does every other aircraft ever built.

The Nomad’s early “bad name” followed some pretty harsh “testing” by GAF and subsequent service with the Australian Army. Two Australian Nomads crashed as apparent results of failures in the tail—an early (flutter-induced) failure in the tail of the prototype N24 resulted in the death of GAF’s chief test pilot and its assistant head designer, while an RAAF N24 crash in 1990 claimed one Australian serviceman’s life.

Much of the early problem with the Nomad’s tail—which was subsequently modified and strengthened in any case—lay not so much in its inherent design, according to Richard, but in its users failing to guard against the potential for damage on the ground if left without control locks in windy conditions, or if subjected to repetitive high power ground runs. The aircraft’s impressive STOL characteristics derive, in part, from the massive size of its tail surfaces and in such a relatively small airframe, the potential for these to encounter hidden damage as a result of battering themselves from stop to stop, or the buffeting of continual high power ground runs, cannot be overstated.

There has been some history of cracking in the box sections of Nomads’ tailplanes but Air Safaris proved in practice (even before the tailplanes were modified) that looking after the aircraft on the ground (for example, not making sustained high-power engine run-ups and, in particular, ensuring that the gust locks are always in place when parked) prevented such problems occurring.

Ever since Air Safaris began operating Nomads, it has been a standard operating procedure for its pilots to insert control locks as a first priority immediately after landing—and in 27 years of constant service in some of the windiest conditions one might experience anywhere, the company has never had an issue with damage to its Nomads’ tail-planes.

The list of Nomad crashes around the world—there have been 26 hull-loss accidents involving 81 fatalities—make interesting reading. Despite early criticism of the Nomad’s tail, only two crashes were directly attributable to tail failure—the prototype and one Australian Air Force N24, the tailplane of which had previously been in an experimental programme and had been subjected to long-term asymmetric high power ground runs. None of the other crashes suggest any kind of structural fault, despite the fact that its design means most of the 172 Nomads built have spent most of their working lives in primitive conditions and rugged terrain.

Quite simply, many of the fatal crashes have been the result of poor flying and not faulty aircraft. Flying into hills in bad weather cannot be blamed on an aircraft, and such accidents have claimed almost half of those killed in Nomad crashes. Furthermore, in an aircraft capable of flying slower than most two-seat training aircraft, there should be no excuse for a Nomad stalling and crashing on approach, as happened in the 1976 crash of a Malaysian N22B.

One feature of the Nomad that has suffered enduring criticism has been its Rolls Royce (previously Allison) engines. Indeed, at least four of the fatal crashes were preceded by engine failures after takeoff.

However, here too, Richard is convinced that appropriate standard operating procedures (SOPs)—which Air Safaris has been fastidious in sticking to—overcome any potential problems with the engines. There is little doubt that the miniscule Rolls Royce engines (only 420 shp each) can be prone to failure if abused or operated at their limits constantly. Indeed, Air Safaris did experience some initial problems with engines in their first Nomads, but, as is often the case with second-hand aircraft, Richard believes these were historical legacies of operations by previous owners. “Once we got past the historical issues with the engines,” Richard says, “we had a very good run with them—and it was definitely an engine issue and not an aeroplane issue.”

The standard engines have TBOs of 3,500 hours, which Air Safaris’ machines have consistently lived up to as a result, Richard insists, of Air Safaris’ conservative operations, including temperature limitations well below those specified by the manufacturer. For example, despite a manufacturer’s maximum TOT of 927 degrees for up to 10 seconds on start, Air Safaris imposes an 850-degree maximum. As Richard rightly points out, “Nobody is going to count to ten while the TOT gauge reads 927 degrees. Compared with the PT-6, in which the temperature climbs predictably and slowly during start, it wouldn’t be too much of an exaggeration to say that with the Rolls Royce 250, every start is a bit of an exciting exercise—the TOT moves much quicker than in the PT-6. Our company maximum of 850 degrees gives our pilots time to realise if the temperature is heading towards the maximum and shut-down early; it gives us a bit of a buffer.”

The Rolls Royce 250 is cycle- as well as time-limited and this has occasionally been an issue for Air Safaris. Despite the engines being ultra-reliable under Air Safaris’ conservative SOPs and thorough maintenance support, the company’s short sectors and flight times mean cycle limitations are a real issue. The Nomads need to be doing between 35–40 minutes a flight in order to reach TBOs without cycle limits being reached prior to hour life. Unfortunately, because many of its flights involve stops at intermediate airports, the company is severely penalised in this regard.

Because the fleet’s utilisation is so heavily weather dependent, it is also penalised on time-limited items such as propellers, which commonly run out of calendar time long before operational hours. Since Air Safaris began, it has been essential for the company to cost its operations carefully to take account of these things.

In addition to strict SOPS in relation to control-locks and engine temperatures, Air Safaris has also imposed stricter limitations than the Nomad’s manufacturer on flap speeds. Once again, this is to provide a “buffer” and reduce what the company sees as unnecessary in-flight loads. The GAF-recommended maximum flap speed is 107 knots, but Air Safaris’ own maximum is more than ten knots slower.

The Nomad is such an efficient short landing machine that there is no need to stress the wings or flaps unnecessarily. The N22 was a true STOL aircraft (“The N22 could even give the Porter a good run for its money in this area,” says Richard) and while the N24 is still a fantastic short lander, it is not nearly as eager to get off the ground—although it is still more than adequate for far shorter strips than many might believe. From Tekapo Airfield, which sits at 2,500 ft AMSL, a fully loaded N24 has a takeoff–50 ft distance of less than 600 metres—but, in full “short landing” mode, can land from 50 ft in around 440 metres (Air Safaris has no need to make such short landings and, for the sake of passenger comfort, never attempts them). Nomad operators need to be very aware of their aircraft’s ability to land on far shorter strips than they can take off from. “Be careful where you put it cos you gotta get it out again!”

In addition to Air Safaris’ three major “amended” SOPs—control locks, engine limits and flap speeds—the company has always looked after the general condition of its aircraft with great care. Air Safaris’ machines are always clean and meticulously maintained, and after 27 years of virtually completely trouble-free operation, Richard Rayward has no doubt that their conservative SOPs and TLC of their machines have paid off.

He says the Nomad is an aircraft that engenders a lot of confidence and he has done some big ferry flights in them. By way of demonstrating their reliability, Richard uses the example of ZK-NMD, which he flew to Australia following a request from ASTA (which supported the Nomad after GAF) to provide an aircraft for further testing of the flap system. NMD flew Tekapo–Sydney–Melbourne, carried out a full recertification test programme in the aircraft and flew home—without a single snag.

So is the Nomad a “perfect” aeroplane? For what Air Safaris asks of it, Richard says it comes close. One particularly good point from the pilot’s perspective is its outstanding visibility. When flying in area like Mt Cook where there is lots of other traffic, this is very valuable and, as a pilot, it is also great to have such good visibility when landing. Nevertheless, it does have its quirks, like all aircraft. It is quite heavy in the controls, yet with its full flying tail, extremely sensitive in pitch.

“During all the years we’ve been operating them, we’ve seen small areas that could be improved and done our best with minor changes in those areas,” says Richard. “Some of the things we’ve identified as candidates for improvement are ergonomics—things that could be easily fixed with only minor changes. I believe Gippsland will address these.

“For example, carbon fibre interior panels as used in the GA8 would improve the wearability of interiors. The current interiors aren’t particularly ‘durable’ in terms of normal passenger wear and tear. Also, GAF used fixed stays on doors and luggage lockers. In the early days, we sometimes had trouble with passengers who, if something wouldn’t shut, would simply ‘push harder’—with inevitable, expensive results. So I would suggest to Gippsland that it replaces any fixed stays with gas struts in future.”

While the airframe, components and engines have all proved remarkably reliable in constant service, one frustrating issue Air Safaris has encountered has been its engine fire extinguishing systems. Servicing them and obtaining the components (which are lifed) has been a huge frustration. When Air Safaris bought its first Cessna Caravan, Richard was interested to discover that Cessna deliberately avoided installing engine fire extinguishing systems, apparently for similar reasons.

Overall, says Richard, the Nomad has lived up to every expectation. “Our chief engineer at the time we bought them said that GAF had used good quality expensive componentry throughout and he told me he doubted we’d ever have much trouble with them…he was right.”

It has not only been with the Porter and Nomad that Air Safaris has “led the way” in scenic flight operations in New Zealand. It was also the first company to buy the Gippsland GA-8 Airvan. As reported in the previous article, Richard shares the view of the type’s other major operator in New Zealand that the Airvan has a major future here.

From the moment Gippsland’s demonstrator Airvan landed at Tekapo, the Air Safaris management pilots knew straight away it was another “right” aeroplane for the company—so much so that the demonstrator aircraft never left Tekapo. Richard paid a deposit on the spot, and the aircraft (and two more since) is still in Air Safaris service today.

The Airvan is another simple, reliable and extremely efficient workhorse for scenic operations. It is no beauty and neither is it a “rocket” in terms of performance, but it excels in economics, ergonomics and practicality and has great passenger appeal for such a small aircraft, with the feel of a much larger aircraft inside.

According to Richard, the Airvan has made a big difference to the company and he describes it as a good little money earner. One Airvan can economically handle from two to seven average sized passengers (the 207 it replaced often struggled to carry five typical European passengers within its payload despite its “seven” passenger seats). With the Airvan handling up to seven passengers, the Grand Caravan taking anywhere from seven to thirteen and the Nomad typically taking twelve to fifteen passengers, the combinations available with the three types means Air Safaris is always able to maximise efficiency no matter what size group comes though the door. Such flexibility pays off regularly because, as any tourist operator would confirm, group numbers often change from minute to minute, right up until takeoff.

Richard is very happy that it was Gippsland that bought the production rights to the Nomad and is talking of putting them back into production. “I think Gippsland are the right people to do good things with the Nomad,” he says and explained that many of those involved in designing the Airvan were originally involved with the Nomad. “They [Gippsland] have told me that the very first Nomad design looked much like an Airvan. There’s no doubt you could incorporate some of the good features of the Airvan into a Nomad,” he says, and adds with a grin, “You could incorporate some of the good features of the Airvan into the Caravan, for that matter!”

Air Safaris’ greatest single financial commitment to date was the decision to purchase a Cessna C208B Grand Caravan. The company was aware of the Caravan’s potential long before it bought one and had assessed it frequently; it was unquestionably a magnificent aeroplane, and a perfect “fit” for Air Safaris with its turbine power, size, and seating capacity. While occasional visits by US demonstrators and updates from Flightline’s Brian Sutherland, had maintained Air Safaris’ interest in the Caravan, the over-riding concern had always been whether such a high capital value aircraft could be viable in a low utilisation (weather-dependent) scenic operation.

As outlined in the previous part of this article, when continued support for the Nomad’s Type Certificate was in doubt, Air Safaris had to seriously consider a viable replacement and finally made the decision to sell one Nomad and purchase the stretched 208B Grand Caravan in order to assess the type’s suitability and viability in its operation.

The Grand Caravan can easily carry 13 passengers and is legally allowed to do so in New Zealand. However, some countries limit single-engine aircraft to carrying no more than nine passengers. Before making a commitment to buy a Caravan, Air Safaris had to be confident that there were no plans to change the rules in New Zealand, as it would not be financially viable for its scenic operation with only nine passengers.

Thankfully, the NZ CAA recognises the reliability of the Caravan and its power plant, and gave Air Safaris written assurance that the rules would not be changed. Its assurance that the Caravan’s full seating capacity would continue to remain available is seen as a positive approach by the NZ CAA to encourage operators in the often congested and noise-sensitive tourist scenic areas to upgrade to larger turbine aircraft.

The Grand Caravan has proved to be an excellent aircraft for Air Safaris—as expected—much enjoyed by pilots and passengers alike, and it is very capable in the demanding environment of the Mt Cook and Mackenzie area. However, its service alongside the Nomads has confirmed for Air Safaris just what an excellent aircraft the Nomad still is.

As a passionate environmentalist—in the truest sense—Richard questions the extreme view taken by a minority that tourist aviation has no place in alpine areas. “Aviation provides one means by which anybody can experience wonderful scenery—without leaving any lasting trace,” he says. “It requires no infrastructure—no roads, huts, toilets or tracks—and it makes it possible for anyone, regardless of age, infirmity or physical limitations, to enjoy the remote and stunning alpine areas. The one down side for aviation is noise impact and aircraft operators need to be proactive in considering the values of ground based users.”

Air Safaris has taken the issue seriously. By moving to a smaller fleet of larger capacity aircraft and quieter turbo prop engines for the largest aircraft, it has made every effort to be considerate, and further minimises the noise impact of its aircraft by reducing frequency of movements (in its inherently quieter aircraft) and by flying specific routes and altitudes in noise sensitive areas. “I believe there needs to be a fair and objective balance between making the scenic wonders available to anyone, and the small minority’s desire to exclude aircraft noise in the remote alpine and wilderness areas.

“There are two sides to every story,” Richard adds. “Hikers might resent seeing planes overhead—they often don’t notice our quiet turboprops—but on the other side of the coin, our passengers have the pristine snow fields below often covered with tracks and other signs of human impact to dispel the effect of uninhabited, remote and frozen splendour.” Some years ago, through one summer, Air Safaris’ passengers were treated to the sight of 20-metre high letters—laid out by caring and “environmentally aware” folk, of course—on the Franz Josef Névé saying “F**K OFF”.

Richard points out that regardless of how careful ground-bound hikers and climbers are, they have a more immediate effect on the physical environment than aircraft overhead. Aircraft might upset some people on the ground, but they do not physically affect the ground environment itself. Many of the people who take scenic flights are foreign tourists who provide significant income for the whole of New Zealand. “Surely,” says Richard, “it is better to afford them access to our wonderful scenery in the least environmentally threatening manner possible.”

“I think it’s fair that as people who’ve been fastidiously ‘responsible’ about this issue from the beginning, we can say it isn’t all ‘one way’. It is important for people to realise there is another side to this issue.”

In addition to its environmental fastidiousness since the beginning, Air Safaris’ other strong point has always been its strict safety culture. In 1996, the company received the Director of Civil Aviation’s Award for Safety in Aviation. In an ironic tragedy, two years later, one of the company’s pilots and two Japanese tourists in a four-seat Cessna single died in a mysterious crash for which no definite cause was ever established.

To the utterly professional and dedicated Air Safaris team, the crash was an unimaginably deep blow. Despite the sadness and tragedy for all concerned, it was telling of company’s genuine safety culture that a comprehensive investigation revealed no systemic failures and it retained a “clean” bill of (operational) health.

Telling also of the kind of people at Air Safaris is the fact that ten years after the tragedy, the families of the two tourists who died in the crash maintain contact with the company, and a grandchild of one of the victims has even visited and stayed with Ros and Richard Rayward in Tekapo.

While the crash continues to haunt Richard Rayward’s thoughts—his dedication to aviation safety is as sincere as his desire to breathe—he draws some measure of comfort from the realisation that the victims’ families do not “blame” Air Safaris in any way. Regardless of the lack of blame, Richard says the emotional scars will remain with him forever and the crash is something he finds extremely difficult to talk about.

It was, without doubt, the most difficult period in Richard’s life and that of Air Safaris. There is no doubt that such a crash would have destroyed a “sub-standard” company. Richard says he was very lucky to have had the team of people at Air Safaris that they did at the time, as everyone stuck together, which allowed them to pull through. He was heartened by the enormous support he and the company received from aviators around the country, which, this writer suggests, is a sign of the respect with which company is viewed.

As difficult as the rigorous investigative process was, Richard says he was grateful to the CAA, which did not “over-react” as might have been tempting in the circumstances (any air crash has a high public profile). Instead, he says, the agency carried out all of its duties objectively and established that Air Safaris’ systems and people were above reproach.

The pilot who died in the crash had been with Air Safaris for a couple of years before the crash, and Richard describes him as having always been particularly cautious and extremely keen to please.

If there could possibly have been a “silver lining” to such a dark emotional cloud, it was that the incident reinforced the already fanatical safety culture of the company. SOPS have taken on even greater significance than they ever did and pilot proficiency checks—always fastidiously carried out in the past—have assumed even greater importance than before.

The 1998 tragedy has been the only real low point in a wonderfully successful almost 40-year operation for Air Safaris. Today, the company flies more than 20,000 passengers a year over two World Heritage National Parks and continues to grow from strength to strength. Richard Rayward says he feels truly privileged to have been part of providing this service.

Not only does he take pride in the company’s outstanding product and service, he is quietly proud of how many airline pilots now flying Airbus and Boeing airliners around the world began their commercial careers at Air Safaris.